Mr. Speaker, I yield

myself 4 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, on grave occasions like

this when we pass a war powers resolution,

surely, surely one of the things

we should seek is a broad base of support.

The amendment I propose in the

nature of a substitute seeks to broaden

the base for this resolution. If we adopt

it, I believe that H.J. Res. 114 will gain

votes and pass this House by an even

bigger majority.

I want to make it clear that we have

not broadened the appeal of this resolution

by watering it down. My substitute

unflinchingly supports the

President’s campaign and the Security

Council for beefing up arms inspection

and backing them up with force, and if

the Iraqis defy the new inspectors and

the Security Council responds with

military action, as it should, it authorizes

the use of our Armed Forces. It

empowers President Bush to use our

Armed Forces just as his father did in

1991 in the Persian Gulf War in a military

action sanctioned by the Security

Council. If on the other hand the Iraqis

defy the inspectors and the Security

Council fails to take action, fails to respond,

the U.S. will be faced with going

it alone.

In these dramatically different circumstances

my amendment calls for a

second vote by the Congress to approve

an attack of the use of force, but it ensures

the President a fast track for its

consideration. There are various differences

between these two resolutions.

The preamble is different, but this is

the key difference, and it is an important

difference.

I want to make clear, however, that

there is no difference with respect to

our assessment of Saddam Hussein.

Those of us who support this substitute

see him as a menace and a threat. We

agree with the President in demanding

that the Security Council enforce its

resolution and allow him no quarter.

But for several reasons we do not want

to see the United States act alone, and

this is not just our concern. Over the

last several weeks we have spent days

talking to retired general officers who

have experience in this field, to General

Hoar and General Zinni, former

commanders of Central Command, to

General Clark and General Boyd,

former Commanders of Europe, and

they have agreed on this much. If we

act alone, they told us, instead of being

the United Nations versus Iraq, any

war that happens, instead of being a

war legitimated by the U.N. Charter,

this will be the United States versus

Iraq and in some quarters the U.S.

versus the Arab and Muslim world.

That is why one general officer told us

‘‘I fear if we go it alone we may pay a

terrible price.’’

Point number two, in any conceivable

military confrontation with Iraq

with or without allies, the United

States will win. But having allies, especially

allies in the region, could be a

big tactical advantage, like Saudi Arabia,

Turkey, and it will make it easier

to achieve victory and less costly in

money and, most importantly, less

costly in human life.

Three, the outcome after the conflict

is actually going to be the hardest

part, and it is far less certain. We do

not want to win this war only to lose

the peace and swell the ranks of terrorists

who hate us. A broad-based coalition

will raise our chances of success

even more in the post-war period.

I know that some will say this is an

imposition on the President’s power, a

second vote, but in truth it is nothing

more than the age-old system of checks

and balances built in our Constitution.

It is one way that Congress can say

what we believe, that any action

against Iraq should have the sanction

of the Security Council and the support

of a broad-based coalition, and if it

does not, we should have a further say

on it.

Others will say that this resolution

relies too heavily on the Security

Council, but let me say, Mr. Speaker,

the precedent it follows was the precedent

set by President Bush in 1991. He

turned to the United Nations first. He

secured a series of resolutions from the

Security Council that culminated in

Resolution 678. He did not threaten not

to go elsewhere, he went straight to

the Security Council. The end was a

successful military action and I think

a model worth emulating. My substitute

does just that. I urge my colleagues

to follow the precedent set by

President Bush in 1991 and support my

substitute amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of

my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield

myself 30 seconds to respond to the arguments

made on the other side. First,

they claim that this bill somehow,

even though there is not a word in it,

supplants Public Law 102–1, which has

the authority to go after terrorists,

which is not true, and then they say

that we are wrong in saying to the

President, we do not want to dilute the

focus on terrorism; we want you to certify

to us that if we go to war in Iraq,

it will in no way impair our first priority,

and that is to get al Qaeda. We

have to decide which way we want to

go.

We say, that is still the law of the

land, 102–1. We backed it then, we support

it now, and we want to make al

Qaeda our first priority.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 11⁄2 minutes to

the gentleman from Texas (Mr. REYES),

a Vietnam veteran and a member of

the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. Speaker, I yield

myself the balance of my time to respond

to some arguments that have

been raised. Let me go back to Public

Law 102–1; the allegation that somehow,

somewhere this bill supplants it.

Far from supplanting that bill, which

was the Afghan War Powers Act, we reassert

in this legislation the primacy

of our policy, and that is to go after al

Qaeda. We do that by saying to the

President, before we go off in pursuit of

another armed objective, military objective,

we want you to tell us that

this is not going to divert our focus

from the primary objective, which is to

get the guys that did what they did in

New York on 9/11. We do not want to divert

or dilute our focus from that at

all. That is in the centerpiece of this

particular bill.

My good friend, the gentleman from

Illinois (Mr. HYDE), has said that many

of us on this side of the aisle voted for

action in Kosovo. I did. And I am proud

of it because we stopped another butchery

in the backyard of Europe by doing

so. We did not go to the U.N. then, and

the gentleman knows why. Because the

Russians are on the Security Council

and they would have blocked us.

Politics and diplomacy is a pragmatic

thing. That is why we did not go

there. But it was multilateral, because

it was an undertaking by NATO, and

we tried to use collective defense in

that particular case. It simply proves

the points.

Now, let me say something else that

I said at the outset because it is important.

A lot of good people have argued

that we are relying too much, too

heavily on the U.N., and specifically on

the Security Council, because that is

really the body that applies here. But I

was here in 1991, and when President

Bush asked for a vote to go to war in

the Persian Gulf, I was one of 86 on this

side of the aisle who said you have got

my support, Mr. President.

But remember what he did then, just

days after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait,

President Bush said this invasion will

not stand, but he also declared his vision

was nothing less than a new world

order. His words, a new world order.

He turned first to the United Nations

and went to the Security Council and

got the first in a series of resolutions

that culminated in Resolution 678

which authorized the use of force.

President Bush obtained all those Security

Council resolutions, with our

support, but without an express war

powers resolution until literally days

before the war began.

Rather than asserting that he could

go it alone, stiffing the Security Council,

he sought the Security Council approval.

He sought allies to stand with

us and cover approximately $62 billion

out of the $66 billion total cost of the

war. The result, a successful military

action, a successful diplomacy, and I

think a model worth emulating. And

that is exactly what this resolution

does.

Where does this resolution come

from? A couple of weeks ago, we had

one of the last of the general officers

who testified before our committee

who has experience in this area, Wes

Clarke, whom I greatly respect. He is

certainly no warrior who shrinks from

a fight. He was always advocating force

in Bosnia to straighten out that situation

there and in the Balkans.

Here is what he told us. He said, First

of all, time is on your side right now.

Make the maximum advantage of it.

First go for beefed-up arms inspections,

a more truthful inspections program.

This will have a couple of benefits. It

will constrain Saddam, and it will give

you legitimacy when he ultimately

bucks you.

Secondly, he said, our diplomacy will

be further strengthened if we have an

act adopted by Congress expressing our

resolve to use force if necessary. But he

said the resolution need not at this

point authorize the use of force. It need

simply agree on the intent to authorize

the use of force if other measures fail.

Mr. Speaker, that is exactly what we

have done, both of those things.

Finally, he said, If efforts to resolve

the problems by the United Nations

fail, seek the broadest possible coalition

to bring force to bear.

We have done what General Clark has

recommended. It is embodied in this

resolution. It follows the precedent set

by President Bush. It is worthy of

every Member’s support, and I hope

Members will vote for it.